INTRODUCTION
It has been called the "the No. 1 occupational hazard of the 1990s" 1 and the "disease of the information age." 2 The injury is known as cumulative trauma disorder ( CTD), 3 or repetitive strain injury (RSI), and it became the fastest-growing occupational injury or disease by the end of 1 2001 , at 1B (referring to some repetitive injuries as "Silicon Valley syndrome"). Though the increased attention to repetitive stress injuries may in part be the result of the spread of the affliction to white-collar workers, the injury itself has existed for years. Infra note 31. In fact, it tends to be most common among certain blue-collar workers such as meatpackers, nursing aides, truck drivers and grocery workers. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Lost-Worktime Injuries and lllnesses: Characteristics and Resulting Time Away from Work, 1999, at 4-5 (2001) [hereinafter Lost-Worktime Injuries].
3. CTDs are commonly understood as injuries that can result from chronic and repeated stress of a muscle, tendon or nerve. Carpal tunnel syndrome is a common type of CTD. One commentator provides the following examples of workplace injuries that are generally characterized as CTDs: "a newspaper reporter's hand aches after many hours at a computer keyboard; a butcher experiences intense wrist pain while cutting meat; a housekeeper awakens in the middle of the night with numb fingers following a hard day of scrubbing floors." Allard E. Dembe, Occupation and Disease: How Social Factors Affect the Conception of Work-Related Disorders 24 ( 1996) .
While the number of reported cumulative trauma injuries has grown, a new and valuable discipline surrounding workplace designcommonly known as "ergonomics" 9 -has become available to employers in order to prevent such injuries. Ergonomics encompasses such traditional "preventive" measures as employee education on proper posture, as well as more significant changes that include job rotation to minimize the risk of injury for repetitive motion, hiring more workers, and slowing down the rate of production. Several studies of ergonomics in individual workplaces show that ergonomic changes have increased worker productivity by up to 25%, and have reduced the cost of sick leave, staff turnover, and workers' compensation. 10 Since ergonomics was first introduced to industry, it has become a staple of occupational health and safety for Nat'l Acad. of Soc. Ins., Workers' Compensation: Benefits, Coverage, and Costs, 1997-1998 New Estimates 1-2 (2000), available at http://www.nasi.org/workcomp/l997-98Data/wc97-98rpt.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Nat'l Acad. of Soc. lns., 1997-1998 Workers' Compensation]. This report also indicates that a tightening of eligibility for workers' compensation benefits was one of several likely factors behind this decline in costs. Id. at 30.
9. Ergonomics, the new applied science for the workplace, is broadly defined as " [t] he science relating to man and his work. many employers, 11 as well as an increased focus of·governmental attention.
12 1n 1990, Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole proposed developing an ergonomic standard for employers, and despite strong resistance from the business community and Republicans in Congress, the standard was finally promulgated in the closing days of the Clinton Administration. 13 But after the election of President George W. Bush, the Republican-controlled Congress acted quickly to repeal the regulations, using the 1996 Congressional Review Act for the first time to overturn an agency rule. 14 The bill was signed by President Bush as the first major law of his presidency. 15 This Note argues thatjudges in workers' compensation cases should use ergonomic evidence and the lens of the original workers' compensation "bargain" in deciding close cases about "work-relatedness." As it is commonly understood, state statutes creating workers' compensation consist of a bargain between employees and employers: Employees gave up their common-law right to sue employers in tort for workplace injuries, but were guaranteed a right to recovery under workers' compensa-11. According to OSHA, three-<juarters of businesses with 500 or more employees have analyzed ergonomic hazards and taken some steps to decrease the risk of CTDs, but fewer than 30% of employers with 20 or fewer employees have taken such steps. See Similar actions by OSHA resulted in agreements with all of the Big Three auto companies-General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler-to implement comprehensive ergonomic programs in order to reduce occupational injury rates. After employers challenged OSHA's authority to issue citations for ergonomic violations, the Occupational Health and Safety Commission held that ergonomic problems were "recognized hazards" that employers had a "general duty" to avoid. See Sec'y of Labor v. Pepperidge Farm Inc., I7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) I993 (OSHRC 1997) (holding that ergonomics hazards, in particular lifting and repetitive motion, may be cited under the general duty clause of Occupational Safety and Health Act). The question of the applicability of the "general duty" clause of the Occupational Health and Safety Act to ergonomic violations took several years to reach the courts because the fines imposed by OSHA employers for ergonomic violations generally induced employers to settle, rather than challenge OSHA through the courts. David J. Kolesar tion without having to prove fault, while employers agreed to more certain recovery by employees for work-related injuries, but with a limit on damages. An analysis of cases in workers' compensation and tort, however, reveals that this bargain is betrayed for workers with CTDs, with claimants in tort often finding it easier to prove liability as compared to those receiving workers' compensation. Ultimately, this Note proposes an ergonomics-based burden-shifting framework that achieves the initial intent of workers' compensation while taking advantage of contemporary advances in science and health.
Part 1 explores the "original bargain" of workers' compensation, its common-law roots, and its subsequent expansion to cover illnesses and injuries beyond the paradigmatic industrial accident. Part II looks closely at the case law surrounding proof of causation for CTDs, focusing specifically on the differential treatment under workers' compensation laws and the common-law tort system. Part Ill argues for the importance of using the "original bargain" lens in interpreting workers' compensation laws and considers how ergonomics can inform this analysis. Part III ultimately puts forward a specific burden-shifting framework that uses ergonomic principles to help assess the "work-relatedness" of CTDs in workers' compensation cases.
I. THE ORIGINAL BARGAIN: STATE WORKERS' COMPENSATION REGIMES
In the nineteenth century, employers had no responsibility to compensate employees for harm suffered in the workplace. At that time, it was thought that taking any job meant that the worker assumed the risk of injury, particularly if it was an expected occupational hazard. 16 This consensus changed in the late nineteenth century, when railroads were being built and workers were being injured in the process.I7 Under the fault-based tort system, plaintiffs experienced occasional success before juries in recovering large damage awards. 18 As a result of these develop- Rev. 349, 350 (1976) ("Despite the lack of any conscious, voluntary choice on the part of an employee to subject himself to an occupational hazard, he had no right to collect for an injury arising from dangers normally incident to his employment.").
17. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 50, 52 (1967) ("The explosive growth of tort law was directly related to the rapidity of industrial development. The staple source of tort litigation was and is the impact of machines-railroad engines, then factory machines, then automobiles-on the human body."). Railroads accounted for more serious industrial accidents than any other enterprise in the middle of the nineteenth century. Id. at 60 n.34.
18. Although it was still highly uncertain that plaintiffs would recover, the large jury verdicts in cases of recovery meant that litigation presented a serious risk for employers. Nat' I Acad. of Soc. lns., 1997-1998 Workers' Compensation, supra note 8, at 3 ("Under the ments, employers pushed to create a workers' compensation system in order to limit and make more predictable the amount of damages paid out. By 1920, all but seven states had enacted workers' compensation laws, and today, each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia has its own program. 19 The workers' compensation "bargain" between employers and employees was intended to be simple: In exchange for immunity from tort actions, employers would provide employees with swift, though limited, compensation for work-related injuries. 20 Both sides gained from this trade-off. 21 Employers received a measure of protection from sizable jury verdicts for workplace injuries, while employees significantly increased tort system, workers often did not recover damages and sometimes experienced delays or high costs when they did. While employers generally prevailed in court, they nonetheless were at risk for substantial and unpredictable losses if the workers' suits were successful."); Terry Thomason et al., Workers' Compensation: Benefits, Costs, and Safety Under Alternative Insurance Arrangements 5 (200I) ("On those infrequent occasions when employees did win these lawsuits, employers sometimes had to pay substantial cash awards.
I9. Nat'l Acad. of Soc. Ins., I997-I998 Workers' Compensation, supra note 8, at 2. Much has been written about the history of workers' compensation laws and their common-law roots. For a good start, see generally James R. Chelius, Liability for Industrial The legal theory most often used to describe the rationale for the workers' compensation system is the social compromise theory, providing that both employers and employees gained and lost rights when workers' compensation replaced employers' tort liability. The employer compromised by waiving all of its common-law defenses to a claim, and by compensating workers for all job-related injuries irrespective of fault; the worker compromised by waiving the right to maintain a tort action against the employer, and by accepting a more certain but smaller, often predetermined amount of money as compensation for an injury. Id. (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Alice M. Thomas, The Law of Workers' Compensation: Defining Accidental Injury, 30 How. LJ. 5I5, 5I5 (I987) (stating that drafters of federal their chance of receiving compensation. 22 Employers could no longer try to demonstrate that they were not at fault, or assert one of the "unholy trinity" of affirmative defenses-assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow-servant rule. 23 Both sides lost something as well, of course: Employees necessarily capped their potential compensation,2 4 and employers-at least in theory-agreed to compensate workers more readily. 25 Both sides also achieved a measure of predictability: Employees ostensibly received a guarantee of compensation, employers could purchase insurance at fixed prices to cover the costs of workplace injuries, and both sides-along with society-avoided the transaction costs and uncertainty of litigation. 26 This balancing embraced the original bargain.
and state workers' compensation statutes "successfully reached a compromise" between employers and employees).
22. Friedman ~ Ladinsky, supra note 17, at 69 ("In exchange for certainty of recovery by the worker, the companies were prepared to demand certainty and predictability of loss-that is, limitation of recovery.").
23. Id. at 70. 24. Less commented on in discussions of the "original bargain" is that employees gave up the ability to have their right to compensation determined by a jury. Most commentators treat this simply as a matter of dollars-jury verdicts are likely to be higher than administrative Jaw judges' awards. But there is also the difference of jury members being more likely to identify with the claimant and understand the realities of the work environment and the physical demands of many blue-collar jobs. For a rare example of an administrative Jaw judge's personal identification with the claimant appearing to play a role in awarding compensability, see Blaser v. This particular ALJ has used this kind of a mop on the job, in high school while 'swabbing the deck' in a restaurant kitchen and in the U.S. Army while mopping the mess hall and kitchen and barracks floors. Even these fairly limited experiences remind one of the amount of force and energy in the hands and wrists needed to get the floors mopped and cleaned in a manner satisfactory to a demanding overseer .... Like Mr. Blaser's use of what 1 infer was an electrical floor buffer, I used this kind of buffer myself years ago; and I can still recall the amount of power needed in my hands and wrists to keep it under control, as it were.
25. After New York passed its workers' compensation Jaw, insurance companies raised their rates considerably-indicating the belief that employers' costs would be highe1· under workers' compensation as compared to the common law. Witt, supra note 19, at 1485. Subsequent studies have indicated that workers' compensation did in fact have the effect of raising the cost of work accidents to employers. The scope of the workers' compensation system reflected the common-law tort system it replaced. 27 Common-law tort actions for workplace injuries and illnesses were generally limited to industrial accidents-the factory worker whose hand is mangled in a machine, or the railroad worker who gets burned by falling sparks. This industrial-accident paradigm carried over to the workers' compensation system that replaced tort remedies for workplace injuries. 28 Cumulative trauma injuries, along with occupational diseases and psychological injuries, were left out of this paradigm, in part reflecting contemporary notions of employer responsibility.29 27 . Traditional accounts of the history of workers' compensation in the United States tend to agree that the workers' compensation system reflected the notion of what should and should not be compensated under the common-law, fault-based system. In other words, workers' compensation codified, in a sense, existing notions of fault. But the implications of this are generally overlooked in most accounts. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 17, at 71 ("In essence, then, workmen's compensation was designed to replace a highly unsatisfactory system with a rational, actuarial one. It should not be viewed as the replacement of a fault-oriented compensation system with one unconcerned with fault.").
28. Because this paradigm is fairly limited, many observers believe that for most of its existence, workers' compensation has not covered the majority of employment-related injuries and illnesses. Orin Kramer & Richard Briffault, Workers Compensation: Strengthening the Social Compact 8-9 (1991) ("In unwitting imitation of the commonlaw's approach to industrial accidents, workers' compensation's traditionally limited coverage of occupational disease and archaic procedural barriers left many victims of illness without compensation."). As Dembe and others have pointed out, what counts as a work-related injury or disease is affected by many social factors that vary across time and place.
As Richard Epstein has pointed out, the major weakness of the original bargain was its rigidity and incapacity for self-correction. As a result, the definition of what counts as a compensable event has been expanded through judicial interpretation and legislative enactment-changes that Epstein would evaluate with reference to "the dominant contractual norm" underlying the system. See Epstein, supra note 19, at 808-09. The approach of this Note is similar, but adopts as its reference point the norm within the common-law tort system. 29. One prominent attorney who wrote about workplace accident law in the early twentieth century argued that responsibility, not fault, was the true principle that ought to guide the law of workplace accidents. "The rule of personal liability rests not upon a notion of actual fault on the part of the individual charged with liability, but upon the reasonable imputation of fault arising out of his responsible connection with the instrumentality through which the injury was caused." J. With heightened public attention and changes in social understanding of work-related illnesses and injuries, occupational diseases, such as asbestosis, became covered either judicially or by statute. 30 More recently, CTD claims have become a focus of workers' compensation systems-in some jurisdictions covered as an "injury," in others as a "disease," but often falling through the cracks of the system altogether.
Part 11 of this Note focuses on the difficulty of proving work-relatedness for CTD claims under workers' compensation, as compared with proving causation in common-law tort. Part III presents potential solutions to this discrepancy.
BETRAYING THE BARGAIN: THE DIVERGENCE oF WoRKERs'
CoMPENSATION FROM THE ToRT SYSTEM Until the past two decades, CTDs were rarely considered compensable injuries under workers' compensation.
31 In fact, they were mostly considered the "aches and pains" of life, or natural "wear-and-tear," rather than occupational injuries or illnesses. Concurrent with the expansion of occupational disease coverage, some jurisdictions began to recognize cumulative trauma injuries as compensable. 1999) (ruling that the claimant did not suffer a compensable "injury by accident" because her injury resulted from the cumulative effects of heavy work performed over the course of approximately one hour or more).
34. Cumulative trauma injuries, by definition, occur gradually-and the time and place of injury cannot therefore be pinpointed. Some courts have liberalized the requirement so that the onset of symptoms can qualifY as the definite time and place of injury. Others have used lessons from ergonomics to recognize that many jobs are designed in such a way that each act or repetitive motion is essentially a "micro-trauma"-each of which can be identified as having a definite time and place.
35. CTDs have often not been able to overcome this barrier. The kinds of symptoms reported by many workers with CTDs-aching, pain or tingling in the hands or wristswere seen as common to many occupations, or part of the "natural aging process." See, e.g., Gencarelle v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 892 F.2d 173, 176-78 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that cumulative trauma injury from repeated straining of the knees was not "peculiar" enough to employment as a maintenance man to be compensable as an occupational disease under the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)). Judge Learned Hand argued that it was necessary to limit coverage to occupational diseases "resulting from working conditions peculiar to the calling" so as not to turn the LHWCA into a general health insurance statute. Grain Handling Co. v. Sweeney, 102 F.2d 464, 465 (2d Cir. 1939) (cited in Gencarelle, 892 F.2d at 177); see also LeBlanc v. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring, Inc., 130 F.3d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 1997) (ruling that degenerative lower back condition was not peculiar to claimant's line of work as a longshoreman and therefore was not an occupational disease for LHWCA purposes); Adams v. Contributory Ret. Appeals Bd., 609 N.E.2d 62, 66 (Mass. 1993) ("UJob duties involving common movements done frequently by many humans both in and out of work will not be sufficient to establish an more properly classified as an "injury" or "disease." Medically, the condition is more consistent with injury, but workers' compensation statutes have distinguished between injury and disease on the basis that an injury is unexpected and sudden, whereas a disease is a natural incident of employment and occurs gradually. 3 6 The ability to get compensation for a CTD varies considerably from state to state. A recent national survey on the treatment of CTDs under workers' compensation laws found that compensation for a CTD claim is "very likely" in ten states; "likely" in fifteen states; "fair" in fifteen states; and "case-by-case" in ten states. 37 Some of this divergence stems from variations in the statutes/ 18 but much of it simply reflects confusion over how to classify those disorders which have no simple medical explanation, and do not neatly fit into either the "accident" or "disease" categories that 36. lt has become increasingly clear that jobs with recognized ergonomic hazards will have the expected result of ir-Uury, but injuries by definition are "unexpected" and "by accident." See, e.g., Young v. the statutes create. 39 In some jurisdictions, cumulative, trauma injuries often go uncompensated, even though they would likely be recognized as the employer's responsibility in the tort system. And as two leading commentators point out, "even in jurisdictions that nominally compensate these injuries, many claims go uncompensated." 40 In the last decade, the business community and insurance industry have argued-with some accompanying success in state legislatures-that the increased range of compensable injuries and accompanying benefit payments has tilted the terms of the bargain too far toward employees. Ball-Incon Glass Packaging v. Taber, 888 P.2d 2, 4-5 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994) (ruling that occupational disease, as distinguished from a cumulative trauma injury, must be distinguished by a "gradual onset" and result from a "systemic reaction to something in the work environment which is introduced into the body").
Deciding which category repetitive trauma injuries fall into often requires peculiar twists of logic, and claimants sometimes lose entirely because of statutory technicalities that would not come into play in tort. See the sarcastic observations of one Nebraska judge who writes:
[ 41. The continued rhetoric of a "cost crisis" in workers' compensation is inconsistent with the most recent data. A recent report found that as a share of covered payroll, workers' compensation benefits and costs in 1996 had declined by about 23% from their all-time high in 1992 and 1993. See Nat'l Acad. Of Soc. Ins., Workers' Compensation:
Benefits, Coverage, and Costs, 1996, New Estimates 1 (1999) But the relevant comparison, in assessing the balance of the bargain, is not between the scope of workers' compensation today versus the scope during times past. The relevant comparison is what employers would be held liable for in today's tort system, and whether that is reflected in the scope of the workers' compensation system today. 4 2 This Part will specifically compare the difficulty of proving the causal relationship between work and injury for CTD claims under workers' compensation, as compared with proving causation in common-law tort. In doing so, this Part draws on traditional tort principles, Texas workplace tort law cases, 43 product liability cases involving CTDs, and claims brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). As this Part will demonstrate, workers' compensation jurisprudence has betrayed the original bargain-more certain but limited recovery-by often making it more difficult to prove compensability for legitimate, work-related injuries under workers' compensation than under the tort system.
A. The Nature of The Causation Inquiry
The causation inquiry in personal irtiury tort cases differs in important ways from the causation inquiry in workers' compensation cases. These differences have particularly significant implications for CTD claimants. The traditional causation inquiry in tort consists of two parts-cause in fact" and "proximate cause." The "cause in fact" is also known as "but for" causation, indicating the idea that "but for" the defendant's action or inaction, the harm would not have occurred. Generally plaintiffs can satisfy this requirement fairly easily. On the other hand, the "proximate cause" question-essentially a glorified inquiry into policy considerations to decide whether the defendant should be held liable for his action-raises much more complex questions. Plaintiffs frequently must overcome the burden of demonstrating that the harm was "foreseeable" enough for the defendant's action or inaction to be considered the "proximate cause" of the harm.
The requirement in virtually all workers' compensation statutes that the injury or illness "arise in the course of employment" has commonly been translated to mean that the injury or illness be "work-related." In 23. For a more straightf01ward, if not unbiased view, see Ctr. for Office Tech., supra note 37.
42. As Professor McCluskey points out, "(i]f one takes the more plaintiff-oriented contemporary tort system, rather than the 19th-century tort system, as the baseline, then workers' overall gain from the bargain is less substantial." McCluskey, supra note 29, at 896. The importance of this comparison is discussed in greater detail infra Part liLA.
43. Texas is the only state where workers' compensation is voluntary for employers. Therefore, workers in Texas whose employers have opted out of the workers' compensation system can bring tort claims for workplace i~uries. A 1996 survey found that 39% of the employers in Texas do not carry workers' compensation coverage, and they employ approximately 20% of the Texas workforce. Research and Oversight Council on Workers' Comp., Experiences of Injured Workers Employed by Nonsubscribing Employers 1 (Mar. 1997).
terms of tort principles, "work-relatedness" stands in for causation-the question being whether the work activity was responsible for the illness or injury. This tort-style causation inquiry tends to be where all the "action" in workers' compensation litigation takes place. 44 But the "work-related" requirement in workers' compensation cases is dealt with somewhat differently than causation in tort.
Many workers' compensation jurisdictions use the two-part legal and medical causation inquiry. 45 ln a sense, it mirrors the two-pronged causation inquiry in tort-with medical causation the equivalent of "but for" causation, 46 and legal causation another way of discussing "proximate cause." 47 ln lay terms, the medical and "but for" causation inquiries both ask the question: if not for the factor in question (here, the work activity), 44 . E.g., Jordan Yospe, Note and Comment, U.S. Industries v. Director: "Claim" Versus "Condition" in the Analysis of Workers' Compensation Cases, 12 Am. J.L. & Med. 273, 274 (1986) ("The crux of workers' compensation litigation, regardless of the statute under scrutiny, appears to center upon the 'arising out of and in the course of employment' requirement.").
45 ] n employee must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the workrelated activities probably caused or contributed to the employee's disabling injury as a matter of medical fact .... An employee need not prove direct causation but must establish that the activities caused the activation of disabling symptoms." (citing Appeal of Kehoe, 686 A.2d 749, 752-53 (N.H. 1996))); Yospe, supra note 44, at 283 ("Courts must determine whether the injury is a physical consequence of workplace activity. This is denoted 'medical causation.'").
47. See, e.g., Trinity, 680 So. 2d at 267 (establishing that proof of legal causation requires demonstrating that "the performance of his or her duties as an employee exposed him or her to a danger or risk materially in excess of that to which people are normally exposed in their everyday lives" (discussing Tuscaloosa, 318 So. 2d at 732)); Kehoe, 686 A.2d at 752 ("Where there is no pre-existing condition, any work-related activity connected with the injury as a matter of medical fact would be sufficient to show legal causation."); Burleigh Briggs, 645 A.2d at 659 ("To prove legal causation, where ... the petitioner concedes a preexisting weakness or condition, he must show that his work-related activities substantially would the plaintiff/ claimant be injured? Meanwhile, the legal and "proximate cause" inquiries ask: should the defendant (here, the employer) be held responsible for the harm? But while legal causation tends to be glossed over in workers' compensation cases, the issue of medical causation tends to turn many workers' compensation hearings-especially those involving CTDs-into a "battle of dueling doctors" that is not particularly enlightening as to the ultimate legal question of whether the employers should be held responsible. 48 This problem is compounded by the fact that doctors and lawyers tend to have very different understandings of what constitutes causation. In medicine, causation is discoverable by scientific proof, while in law, causation is a means of assigning the burden of persuasion based on policy considerations. 49 It is commonly observed that medical causation is a more demanding standard than legal causation 50 , but the inquiries are also simply different. One doctor, recognizing this distinction, refused to take a position on the question of causation in a workers' compensation case, stating: "I feel that whether this repetitive trauma is considered to be a cause of her ruptured disc or not is a legal question rather than a medical one." 51 The focus on medical causation in workers' compensation cases is particularly harmful to CTD claimants because of the multiple factors inevitably involved in such injuries.
The treatment of multiple causal factors is another important area where workers' compensation diverges from tort law. According to blackletter tort law, the existence of more than one cause for an injury does contributed to his disability by showing that the work-related activities required more exertion than his non-work-related activities.").
48. As one commentator put it, the "legal question is how much workplace contribution will be enough to trigger the employer's liability under workers' compensation." Yospe, supra note 44, at 275.
49. As one Kentucky court explained:
The legal profession and the medical profession view causation problems from different perspectives. not excuse any particular defendant from liability if that defendant's action or omission was a "substantial factor" in causing the harm . .' \ 2 The language of workers' compensation decisions, however, reveals quite a different approach.
Workers' compensation judges often discuss the issue of causation as if there were only one cause for each injury-an approach that may have made sense under the industrial-accident paradigm but is divorced from the medical reality of occupational diseases and CTDs. Pinpointing one causal factor is next to impossible for multi-factor disorders like cumulative trauma injuries. 53 lt is often difficult, for example, to identifY the extent to which an injury is the result of work-related cumulative trauma over several years, or the result of the "natural aging process. 54. The "natural aging process" is a concept often written into statutes. E.g., Kansas Workers' Compensation Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-508(e) (Supp. 1998) ("An injury shall not be deemed to have been directly caused by the employment where it is shown that the employee suffers disability as a result of the natural aging process or by the normal activities of day-to-day living."). But such statutory language does not provide much guidance to judges, other than reinforcing the requirement of work-relatedness. E.g., Hill, 1999 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 481, at *8 (doctor acknowledging difficulty of isolating causation by saying of claimant: "As you know, she had a history of something approaching trauma. She also got six years older and I am not smart enough to tell you which one caused the change. How To take the prototypical industrial accident as an example, the lack of a safety guard on a machine can be quite clearly the cause of a worker losing a finger. In contrast, the development of a CTD by someone who works in a poultry processing plant, for example, might be primarily due to her work activities, but contributed to secondarily by the regular activity of fishing, gardening, or picking up and holding a young child. Under the "substantial factor" test of tort law, the work activities would no doubt be enough to hold the employer liable, but under workers' compensation, judges often hold in such a scenario that the plaintiff has not carried her burden of proof in showing that the injury was work-related.
The critical question is: Who will bear the risk of the medical uncertainty? Certainly traditional tort law, where the plaintiff carries the burden of proof, places the risk of uncertainty on the plaintiff. And workers' compensation statutes, by and large, do the same by placing the burden of proof on the claimant to prove that the injury was work-related. Within that context, however, judges deciding workers' compensation cases must consider how claimants can carry their burden of proof in light of the original bargain-that compensability (or liability in tort) would be easier to prove under workers' compensation laws than under common law.
B. Permissible Inferences: Evidence To Prove Causation

Inferring Causation From Circumstantial
Evidence. -Given the nature of CTDs, inferences-as opposed to direct proof-are necessary to establish medical causation. An examination of common-law tort and FELA cases indicates that judges and juries are much more willing to make inferences about the causal link between work activities and an employee's injury than judges in the workers' compensation systemY' These inferences can be seen in some workers' compensation cases, but they are the exception. 56 In these common law and FELA cases, courts allow inan activity of daily living, from walking on muddy and uneven terrain, not a normal activity of daily living, for purposes of compensation); In re Comp. of Thorn, WCB Case No. 98-00579, 1999 Or. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 280, at *5-*6 (Or. Workers' Comp. Bd. AprilS, 1999) (testimony of doctor that "nothing is presented during shoulder surgery that would enable a surgeon to distinguish between findings caused by the natural aging process and findings caused by employment" and cause of shoulder condition is thus "idiopathic" or unknown).
55. See Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, supra note 52, at 270 ("Circumstantial evidence, expert testimony, or common knowledge may provide a basis from which the causal sequence may be inferred.") (footnotes omitted).
56. See, e.g., Decker v. Square D Co., 1998 MOWCLR (LRP) LEXIS 58, at *6-*7 (Mo. App. 1998) (stating that "[t)he evidence must establish a direct causal link between a worker's workplace or job duties and the injury-causing disease."); Eaton v. Quincy, 1999
Ill. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 44, at *23 (Indus. Comm'n of Ill. May 28, 1999) (Kinnaman, J., dissenting) ("In this case the majority finds that a firefighter who sits underneath the engine's siren every time he is out on a call has not proven sufficient exposure to noise to win compensation for the resulting hearing loss. The finding defies common sense and the weight of the evidence."); Santos v. Beman Foods, Inc., 1998 NJ. Wrk. Comp. LEX1S 96, at *21-*22 (NJ Div. Wrk. Comp. Oct. 5, 1998) (finding doctor's explanation ferences from circumstantial evidence to prove that work activities caused CTDs. 57 For example, in a Texas case, a group of employees from a major meatpacking plant brought a negligence claim against their employer, who did not participate in Texas' workers' compensation system, charging that their work conditions caused them to develop CTDs. 58 The plaintiffs were allowed to prove causation with circumstantial evidencepresenting evidence of the ergonomic risk factors in the meatpacking plant where they worked, and the medical records of the doctors who "unconvincing" that claimant's serious joint condition was related to having worked in a freezer for more than twenty years). But see, e.g., King v. Vt. Am. Corp., 664 So. Comp. Comm'n Jan. 12, 1999) (ruling that "uncontradicted medical evidence" ascribing the claimant's unusual disease to work, combined with the "undisputed circumstantial evidence" surrounding the onset of the condition after a freezer fire, established causation despite doctors' inability to make a specific diagnosis). See also Bryan v. Allstate Timber Co., 724 So. 2d 853, 855 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that worker's testimony alone can carry his burden of proof for an "accident" claim provided that no other evidence casts serious doubt upon the worker's version of the incident; and the worker's testimony is corroborated by the circumstances following the alleged incident) ( 1998) (acknowledging that the jury can infer the railroad's breach of duty in FELA case, but holding that the plaintiff has not produced even a "scintilla" of evidence).
58. Gutierrez, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12984, at *4. The case was in federal court because of diversity of citizenship. The employer, Excel Corp., was a nonsubscriber to the Texas workers' compensation system and therefore subject to common-law causes of action such as negligence. Id. at *5 n.3. examined them. 59 This is precisely the type of inference that is typically denied in CTD cases under workers' compensation-where proving compensability is supposed to be easier than in tort. 1n addition, employees who bring product liability claims against the manufacturer of a product that causes a work-related CTD are often able to get to a jury on causation without direct evidence. 60 Because FElA requires that plaintiffs prove all of the common-law elements of tort, but has a relaxed evidentiary standard, a FElA claim should be less difficult to prove than a common-law tort claim, yet more difficult to prove than a workers' compensation claim.
61 But with CTD 59. ld. at *9. "[l]t is apparent that the working situation at the Whizard table was rife with conditions known to cause, or at least to be associated with, cumulative trauma disorder." ld. at *11. The Fifth Circuit accepted the possibility of an inference of causation by holding that:
[I]f a plaintiff can establish that she was exposed to enough of the risk factors for a sufficiently long period of time, and that she suffers from a specific injury defined as a cumulative trauma disorder, then it is not, as a matter of law, necessary to present evidence directly stating that the work environment caused the injury. A reasonable jury could infer causation in these circumstances. Id. at *16. Unfortunately for the particular plaintiff, the court also ruled that she "did not present such testimony in this case" because her condition "was not one associated with cumulative trauma." Id.
60 Md. 1997) (recognizing the possible inference that plaintiff knew "that there was very likely a connection between her use of a computer keyboard as a legal secretary and her increasing pain and discomfort"). Employees are generally permitted to bring a claim either against a third-party tortfeasor, such as the product manufacturer, or file a workers' compensation claim.
61. The Federal Employers' Liability Act was intended to depart from common-law principles of liability in order to provide additional protection and relief for railroad workers. A FELA plaintiff must prove the traditional common-law elements of a tort: breach of a duty (negligence), foreseeability, and causation. But the plaintiff need only provide "more than a scintilla of evidence" to prove negligence and can show causation by demonstrating that an employer's action played "some part" in causing the injury. See Aparicio, 84 F.3d at 810.
Recently, the Supreme Court explained the Act as a "federal remedy [for railroad workers] that shifted part of the 'human overhead' of doing business from employees to their employers." Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542 (1994). This justification is very similar to that typically used in explaining workers' compensation statutes. In fact, Justice Harlan once wrote in a dissenting opinion that "(t]his case is a further step in a course of decisions through which the Court has been rapidly converting the Federal Employers' Liability Act ... cases, the ability to use circumstantial evidence-as in common-law tort cases-often makes it easier to prove a FELA claim than the same claim under workers' compensation. ln one Sixth Circuit FELA case, the court held that the deposition of the employer's medical director permitted an inference that a person with a risk factor for injury or illness may result in the person with the risk factor developing the injury or illness.fi2 The court used this inference, combined with evidence of the foreseeability that the repetitive vibrations and shocks of the employee's job might cause repetitive motion injury, to decide that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to create a jury question on causation.fi 3 Again, this type of inference would likely be denied under workers' compensation.
The inability to use circumstantial evidence in workers' compensation is compounded by the requirements of objective medical evidence. Workers' compensation judge often deny benefits for CTDs based on a lack of "objective medical findings"-a requirement that is often written into statute and rarely used in common-law tort cases. 64 Cumulative trauma injuries, by definition, occur gradually and often without symptoms that are either visible or "objective" in the sense of being measurable on medical tests. This problem is itself compounded by many employees' lack of awareness of the nature of cumulative trauma injuries. 05 Nonetheless, there is little doubt that repetitive work activities often play a substantial role in the appearance of CTDs.
Inferring Causation From
Negligence. -Another problem in proving causation under workers' compensation is that not having to prove "fault" or negligence may actually be a detriment to employees, and even to employers in some cases. It is well recognized that the negligence and causation inquiries are not completely separate, 66 65. See, e.g., Galloway v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 374, 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the claimant, an ironworker, had only a sixth-grade education and testified that he did not understand that injuries could occur as a result of cumulative trauma rather than from a specific incident); Weise v. Becton-Dick.inson Co., 4 NCA 700, 1993 Neb. App. LEXIS 367, at *7 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that, until she visited a doctor, claimant attributed symptoms to her pregnancy).
66. In tort claims, evidence of "fault" by the plaintiff or defendant is often used in deciding the appropriate causal connection. See, e.g., Tenbarge v. Ames Taping Tool Sys., Inc., 190 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing the testimony of defendant's medical expert swering the overall question: Should a defendant be held responsible for harm caused to a plaintiff? Indeed, the ability of plaintiffs to infer causation from evidence of negligence is an important contemporary development in tort doctrine-one that is not available to claimants in the "nofault" workers' compensation system.
In workers' compensation cases, judges often deny compensation to claimants who rely on what appears to be a "fault"-based argument for compensability. In the controversial case Waskiewicz v. General Motors Corp., 67 for example, the Maryland Court of Appeals specifically rejected the claimant's argument as too heavily based upon employer "fault." As the court explained:
we must assume that Mr. Waskiewicz's argument before us is founded on the notion that the employer's actions in removing him from and then reassigning him to the repetitive motion work were the significant events triggering a new claim . . . . GM's "fault" impliedly underlies Mr. Waskiewicz's entire theory· of recovery. Workers' compensation is a "no-fault" system, rendering the very foundation of Mr. Waskiewicz's argument quite shaky. 68 This case is a perfect example of a workers' compensation claim where the claimant would have had a significantly better chance of recovery had he been able to litigate fault, either instead of causation or as a factor weighing in favor of compensability. Indeed, the court in Waskiewicz explicitly acknowledges this, and implicitly acknowledges that Mr. Waskiewicz is failed by an overly formalistic reading of the statute, when it writes:
We recognize that the recent aggravation of Mr. Waskiewicz's disability occurred at least in part because GM knowingly removed him from light duty and placed him at risk of such aggravation by assigning him back to an assembly-line job where his duties would include repetitive hand motions. Were the issue that he "cannot rule out alcohol" as a cause of plaintiffs carpal tunnel syndrome because "he does consume some"); Mosley v. Excel Corp., 109 F.3d 1006, 1013 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing "but for" causation in the context of employer's alleged negligence). And in workers' compensation, employee fault often plays a more significant role than a "no-fault" statute should allow. For a particularly egregious twenty-first century example, see Tamar Lewin, Commission Sues Railroad to End Genetic Testing in Work Injury Cases, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2001 , at AIO (reporting on a recent EEOC action against a major railroad for genetically testing the hlood of workers who filed workers' compensation claims for carpal tunnel syndrome). Here, the employer was trying to demonstrate that the injury was the fault of the workers' own genes. 67. 679 A.2d 1094, 1102 (Md. 1996) (denying henefits, in a 4-3 decision, on the grounds that a worsening of one's condition cannot give rise to a new claim for benefits, even though claimant's employer knowingly reassigned the disabled worker to repetitive motion work, which had caused the original condition).
68. 1d. at 1100.
before us a question of equity rather than statutory law, GM would surely not fare so well. 69 
C. Enhanced Procedural and Substantive Burdens in Workers' Compensation Cases
1n the face of the medical uncertainty surrounding cumulative trauma disorders, the burden of proof, resting on the claimant to prove work-relatedness by a "preponderance of the evidence," is often decisive in workers' compensation cases. 70 There are many workers' compensation cases where it is clear that if the plaintiff had the benefit of a presumption of work-relatedness, the result would be different. This commonly occurs when there is conflicting medical testimony that is given equal weight by the judge. 1n such a situation, the judge will often say that the claimant loses because she has not carried her burden of proof. Since the employer is bound to present a medical expert who will say that the injury is not work-related, this scenario occurs quite frequently. 71 1n recent years, often as a reaction to growing claims for CTDs, state legislatures-and in some cases,judges-have acted to raise the procedural burden of proof necessary for compensability beyond what would be required in tort. A few states have required as much as "clear and con-69. ld. at I 101. For an example from the employer's perspective, see Derr Constr. Co. v. Bennett, 873 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Ky. 1994) (upholding the Board's rejection of the employer's "fault based" argument that it should not be liable for medical expenses related to disability predating the specific workplace incident).
70. See, e.g., Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 21, at 662 ("Who bears the burden of proof on causation often determines whether or not an injured worker will be compensated. The majority of states place the burden of proof on the claimant to establish that the disease is causally related to the worker's employment."). Since the claimant must use expert medical testimony to meet the burdens of proof, he or she bears the risks of limitations in medical knowledge. vincing evidence" that the injury is work-related in order to grant relief.7 2 1n tort, of course, the standard for proving causation-and all elements of the claim-is "preponderance of the evidence." Again, this creates a perverse situation-contrary to the original bargain-in which workers' compensation claims are significantly more difficult to prove than tort claims. Indeed, meeting the standard of "clear and convincing evidence" has proven to be nearly impossible for cumulative trauma injuries. Because the injury is generally not visible, and occurs gradually, the causal factors are particularly difficult to isolate.
Distinct from the procedural burden of proof, some legislatures and judges have also imposed increased substantive standards of causation. 73 Some states have required that work be a "major contributing factor" or account for more than fifty percent of the cause of the injury-greater than the "substantial factor" or "foreseeability" tests used to determine proximate cause in tort. 74 Because cumulative trauma disorders are gen-72. For example, the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, as amended in 1992, specifies that cases involving injuries which have resulted from "gradual deterioration or cumulative physical stress disorders" will be deemed compensable only upon a finding of "clear and convincing proof' that the injuries were work-related. Ala. Code § 25-5-81 (c) (2000). Besides cumulative trauma injuries, other types of injuries or diseasesparticularly psychological or heart-related injuries-are sometimes required to meet a higher burden of proof. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 440.09(1) (West Supp. 2000) ("Mental or nervous injuries occurring as a manifestation of an injury compensable under this section shall be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence.").
73. See, e.g., New Jersey's Occupational Disease Law, NJ. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-31 (a) (2000) (disease must be "due in a material degree" to work conditions); Reeves Motor Co. v. Reeves, 105 A.2d 236, 239 (Md. 1954) (holding that "proximate cause" in workers' compensation cases "means that the result could have been caused by the accident and that no other efficient cause has intervened"); Brandt v. Leon Plastics, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 523, 525 (Neb. 1992) (defining the requirement of proving "proximate causation" as showing that the repeated traumas contributed "in some material and substantial degree" to the claimant's injury); Gilchrist v. Trail King Indus., Inc., 612 N.W.2d 1, 3-5 (S.D. 2000) (affirming the Department of Labor's ruling that the claimant's carpal tunnel condition was work-related, and noting that the causation requirement is not one of "proximate" cause but rather that the employment was a "contributing factor" to the injury) ( erally multi-causal, it is extremely difficult to show that work activities-or any one causal agent-accounted for more than fifty percent of the cause of injury. Moreover, most jurisdictions require a "probability," not just a "possibility," that work activities caused the disease or injury. 75 The impact of the recent statutory changes is clear: Workers often will not recover on workers' compensation claims that would result in employer liability if adjudicated as tort claims.
Certainly legislatures have the authority to make such changes. But any changes must be interpreted through the "original bargain" lens. The intent of the workers' compensation system was to make proving compensability easier for claimants, while restricting the amount that could be recovered. But this has not happened for CTDs. By refusing to allow inferences, raising the burden of proof, and raising substantive standards for causation, many jurisdictions have made it even more difficult to prove causation for legitimate CTD claimants under workers' compensation laws than in tort-a result clearly counter to the original bargain.
REsTORING THE BARGAIN: A SET OF PROPOSALs FOR CTD CAsEs UNDER WoRKERS' CoMPENSATION
Part liLA of this Note argues for the methodological importance and propriety of using the "original bargain" lens for judicial interpretation of workers' compensation statutes. This method is particularly appropriate and necessary because of the nature of state workers' compensation statutes-statutes designed to replace common-law rights and obligations. Part lii.B demonstrates how judges can use ergonomic evidence to draw inferences about causation in a way that is consistent with current work-75. See, e.g., Decker v. Square D Co., 974 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that in carpal tunnel syndrome cases, the plaintiff must submit a medical expert who can establish a probability that working conditions caused the disease); Owen v. American Hydraulics, Inc., 578 N.W.2d 57, 63 (Neb. I998) ("A workers' compensation award cannot be based on possibility or speculation, and if an inference favorable to the claimant can be reached only on the basis thereof, then the claimant cannot recover."); Laffey v. City of Jersey City, 289 NJ. Super. 292, 308 (App. Div. I996) (describing the claimants's burden as one of presenting "sufficient, credible, objective evidence" to allow the compensation court to determine with "cautious reasoned probability" that the occupational exposure caused the disease); Handyv. Amfibe, Inc., No. 179-49-39, I998 VA Wrk. Camp. LEXIS 4343, at *6-7 (Va. Workers' Camp. Comm'n Dec. 14, 1998) ("The 'possibility' that an injury is related to the employment is not sufficient to produce a compensable claim, the requisite standard being medical 'probability.'"). But see, e.g., Wallen v. Salon of Music, Inc., 418 So. 2d 421, 42I (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. I982) (finding that the workers' compensation commissioner placed "too great a burden of proof as to causation" upon the claimant by denying benefits despite the testimony of two cardiologists that additional stress from a work-related accident "could have contributed" to the onset of claimant's heart attack).
Common-law and FELA tort cases offer a contrast. In such cases, medical or ergonomic testimony that there is a "possibility" that work activities caused the injury, combined with credible testimony from the claimant, can be enough to allow an inference of causation. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
ers' compensation statutes, developments in common-law tort jurisprudence, and the "original bargain." Part Ill.C presents a specific burdenshifting framework for treatment of CTDs in workers' compensation cases in order to achieve this end. Part 1II.D explains the importance of the application of the "exclusive remedy" doctrine as a self-correcting mechanism to ensure appropriate compensation for employees.
A. Using the "Original Bargain" Lens in Workers' Compensation Cases
Courts have used the "original bargain" theory in a number of workers' compensation cases as a "purposive" method of statutory interpretation.76 With this interpretive method, judges look to the statute's purpose and act as "faithful agents" of-or "cooperative partners" with-the legislature in making decisions. 77 In doing so, judges have taken notice App. 1996) (concluding that strict construction of the term "work performed" would "contravene the legislative intent to ensure the prompt delivery of benefits to the irtiured worker by an efficient and self-executing system"); Guilbeaux v. Martin Mills, Inc., 640 So. 2d 472, 475 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (interpreting the statutory requirement that an injury be "more than a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration" as only applying to non-work activity on the grounds that "to interpret it otherwise ... would lead to an absurd result as it would negate the very purpose for which the Workers' Compensation Act was instituted; namely, to provide relief to employees whose work has caused them injury and the inability to work"); DesMarais v. 80. Louisiana is the clearest example of this. In 1989, the Louisiana legislature amended the definition of "accident" in their workers' compensation statute to require an "unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently" and which is "more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration." La. R.S. 23:1021 (2000). The narrower definition of"accident" was clearly aimed at limiting the number of CTD claims. But the courts have continued to interpret "accident" liberally using the original intent of the statute. For example, one court argued that it was inconsistent with the purpose of the "workers' compensation scheme" to deny the claims of workers who were "worn down by their work rather than immediately the legislature intended the compensation of workplace injuries to be adjudicated in the workers' compensation system, not the tort system.
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But the nature of the workers' compensation "original bargain"-and its common-law roots-has another set of related implications. First, because workers' compensation statutes displaced the common-law tort system, judges should be reluctant to construe workers' compensation statutes such that they do not provide an adequate substitute for the rights the claimant would have at common-law. 82 Indeed, early in the history of workers' compensation jurisprudence, the Supreme Court implied that there might be due process limits to the elimination of common-law tort claims. 83 Secondly, this method of interpretation is familiar from other contemporary contexts such as judicial scrutiny of the waiver 83. E.g., N.Y. Ctr. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917) ("Nor is it necessary, for the purposes of the present case, to say that a State might, without violence to the constitutional guaranty of 'due process of law,' suddenly set aside all common-law mles respecting liability as between employer and employee, without providing a reasonably just substitute."). This was the case first upholding the constitutionality of a workers' compensation law in the United States. See also Epstein, supra note 19, at 794 n.50 ("The quid pro quo has loomed large in the American constitutional treatment of workers' compensation."). Since the early cases, however, the issue of constitutional limits to workers' compensation laws has not been addressed as frequently. But see Brady v. SafetyKleen Corp., 576 N.E. of common-law rights through private contract m the employment relationship. 84 Admittedly, the original bargain lens suggested here is counterintuitive. Most originalist forms of interpretation look to the state of the common law at the time when the statute was enacted. In contrast, workers' compensation laws, as statutes that displace and supplement the common law, should be interpreted with reference to the current state of the common law. 85 Judges do use this method of interpretation with other statutory tort-like remedies that displace or supplement the common law under, for example, the federal environmental and civil rights laws. 86 This method of interpretation is premised on a particular understanding of the bargain: not as a static, one-time settlement occurring when the workers' compensation laws were originally passed in the early part of the twentieth century, but an ongoing trade-off between employees and employers-one that makes it easier to prove liability, but limits 84. Texas courts, for example, have been considering whether employers who do not participate in the Texas workers' compensation system may include waivers in employee benefit plans that prevent employees from bringing negligence claims against their employer. Some courts have held that such a waiver is void and unenforceable because it violates public policy to allow such claims to be waived in exchange for benefits that were As compared with the review of private contracts between an employer and employees, a court should probably be more deferential when reviewing the adequacy of state workers' compensation statutes as a substitute for common-law rights. But the analysis is similar.
85. Cf. Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 51, 61 (1989) ("Because Congress knew that tort rules would evolve, one could argue, it intended that current tort principles continually replace the common-law of 1871 as such common-law became outdated. In that case, the Court would be true to congressional intent in relying on contemporary common-law principles." (discussing section 1983 interpretation)). the amount of damages. 87 In essence, every current worker, by participating in the workers' compensation system, is trading his common-law right to sue for tort for the swift but limited remedy of workers' compensation. Indeed, the idea of worker choice of remedy is still incorporated into other areas of workers' compensation laws. 88 The implication of this understanding of the bargain is clear: Workers' compensation jurisprudence must keep pace with developments in common-law tortjurisprudence such that it remains easier to prove compensability in workers' compensation than in the tort system. 89 When workers' compensation laws were first passed, the mechanism for achieving easier compensability was to remove the requirement that plaintiffs prove fault. But, as demonstrated in Part II, this may no longer be the advantage it once was. In fact, contemporary developments in tort law, particularly the ability to use ergonomic evidence to demonstrate negligence and causation, can put CTD claimants at a distinct disadvantage under workers' compensation compared to tort law. If common-law jurisprudence recognizes new methods of scientific evidence, such as epidemiology or ergonomics, as legitimate ways of allowing inferences of causation, then workers' compensation judges should follow suit. 90 Otherwise, It is wrong to view the compensation system as a static bargain impervious to societal change. Such a view would dictate that ... as the tort system improved, workers would be increasingly disadvantaged by a deal originally designed for their benefit. Instead, the bargain must be recalibrated to reflect the changes in the realities of the tort system and the workplace that have made the terms of the original trade off unacceptable. Id. (citations omitted).
88. For example, workers have the ability to "elect" to pursue workers' compensation claims or a tort claim against a third party such as a manufacturer who may have made a defective product that caused the injury. Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, 6 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, §102-18 to 102-27 (2000) .
89. FELA jurisprudence, particularly as explained hy the Supreme Court in recent years, has followed this model of looking to common-law developments. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 557 (1994) ("Our FELA cases require that we look to the common law when considering the right to recover asserted by respondents."); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 568 (1987) (assuming that "FELA jurisprudence gleans guidance from common-law developments"). As the Third Circuit observed in its treatment of the Gottshall case, one consideration into whether the plaintiff has a right to recovery is whether he has a "solid basis in the present state of common-law to permit him to recover." Gottshall v. Consol. Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 371 (quoted in Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 563 (Ginsburg,]., dissenting)).
90. The justification used by the Supreme Court in a FELA case more than forty years ago is equally applicable to workers' compensation jurisprudence today. In Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co., the Court held that:
[I]nstead of a detailed statute codifYing common-law principles, Congress saw fit to enact a statute of the most general terms, thus leaving in large measure to the courts the duty of fashioning remedies for injured employees in a manner analogous to the development of tort remedies at common law. But it is clear both employees and employers-depending on the case and the issuecould face disadvantages under workers' compensation in ways that stray from the original bargain of guaranteed compensability but limited damages.
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An example of how judges can use the "original bargain" lens helps illustrate a way out of this dilemma. In jurisdictions that have raised the procedural burden of proof for certain injuries to "clear and convincing evidence," courts are likely to face the question of whether uncontradicted, credible medical testimony about the possibility that work activities caused the claimant's injury, combined with credible evidence and testimony from the claimant about his work activities, is sufficient for the claimant to carry his burden of proof. The answer is not evident from the statutory language alone. Because of the heightened burden of proof, and the common-law requirement in most jurisdictions that medical testimony indicate a "probability" of work-relatedness, many jurisdictions may be reluctant to grant benefits under this scenario.
The "original bargain" lens sheds light on how to resolve this question. Recognizing that the original bargain was intended to provide that the general congressional intent was to provide liberal recovery for injured workers, and it is also clear that Congress intended the creation of no static remedy, but one which would be developed and enlarged to meet changing conditions and changing concepts of industry's duty toward its workers. 355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958) (quoted in Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 559 (Souter,]., concurring)).
91. Professor Samuel Estreicher, among others, has pointed out the conundrum:
The statutes reflected a compromise: the employee was assured a fairly certain recovery, but had to forfeit any civil action and the chance, however unlikely, of obtaining more from a jury. Over time, however, the common law restrictions were swept away, life and limb received higher valuation, and juries became exceptionally generous .... What had been an unmistakable advance for workers became an anomaly: a source of injustice to employees who are treated less favorably than others suffering similar injuries outside of the employment context. Symp.J. 185, 203 n.98 (1997) (arguing for a "liberal" approach to determining whether an illness or injury was work-related based on the idea that in the workers' compensation bargain, the plaintiff "buys" insurance against injury on the job in exchange for giving up the right to sue in tort).
Critics of this approach might take a different view of the "original bargain." Some might say that the original bargain only covered industrial accidents, not occupational disease or gradual injuries occurring from the normal course of work. See, e.g., Morris v. Morris, 385 S.E.2d 858, 862 (Va. 1989) (arguing that the original intent of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, adopted in 1918, was to provide compensation for "the most frequently recurring kinds of industrial accidents" and denying compensation for gradual injuries). According to this view, any modifications to this bargain must be made explicitly through legislation. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 Yale LJ. 1357, 1358 (1983) (using traditional common-law principles as the appropriate "benchmark" against which to judge "modern statutory schemes").
greater certainty of recovery to employees, while limiting the amount of recovery, judges should assume that the legislature could not have intended to make it more difficult for claimants with legitimate, work-related injuries to prove compensability. The higher burden of proof is ostensibly designed to prevent fraudulent claims, not deny legitimate ones. lf the judge is convinced that the injury was work-related, then she must award benefits. However, current workers' compensation jurisprudence about the requirements of medical causation and the ability to draw inferences about causation may make such an award difficult. 9 2
The claim here is not that legislatures lack the authority to change procedural burdens of proof and substantive burdens of causation, or that interpretation of workers' compensation laws must march in lockstep with every development in the common law. The claim is that judges have an obligation to interpret workers' compensation statutes in light of the "original bargain" when deciding close questions of common-law or statutory interpretation. This obligation comes from the dual imperative to interpret statutes in light of their "purpose" so as to avoid unreasonable results, and to avoid eliminating common-law remedies without recognizing the substitute provided by statute. The "original bargain" lens should not be determinative in every case, but it should be an influential perspective for workers' compensation judges deciding close cases-particularly in the context of new challenges to the workers' compensation system like .cumulative trauma disorders.
B. Exploiting the Probative Value of Ergonomic Evidence
Ergonomics offers a potential way out of the conundrum for workers' compensation judges trying to obey the statutory requirement that the claimant prove work-relatedness, while fulfilling the original bargain of quick but limited compensation for legitimate work-related injuries. By demonstrating the risk factors present in a particular workplace, ergonomic evidence can allow a fact-finder to infer that work activities caused the injury. Crediting such evidence would require a greater receptivity to inferences than many workers' compensation judges have demonstrated, but these kinds of inferences are frequently allowed in common-law tort claims, in occupational disease claims, and even by some workers' compensation judges facing CTD claimants.9 3
As the common-law tort and FEIA cases demonstrate, ergonomic evidence can give rise to an inference of causation in CTD cases. Indeed, ergonomics can play a critical role in both prongs of the legal and medical causation inquiry under workers' compensation. For medical causation, testimony from a doctor or ergonomist regarding the presence of risk factors in a claimant's work activities that are known to cause CTDs can give rise to an inference that the work activity was "in fact" a substan- tial factor in causing the injury. 94 1n determining legal causation, the equivalent of the "proximate cause" or foreseeability inquiry, the claimant can present evidence that the employer either knew that the claimant's work activities were likely to cause CTDs based on the existence of an in-house ergonomic program, 95 or should have known based on industry norms 96 or government standards. 97 Such inferences, increasingly common with the acceptance of ergonomics in common-law tort jurisprudence, are equally permissible and necessary in workers' compensation cases.
The potential role of ergonomics in determining the compensability of CTDs is analogous to that of epidemiology in assessing claims of occupational disease from toxic chemical exposure. Like CTDs, occupational diseases from toxic chemical exposure develop gradually, often take time to manifest themselves, and rarely offer visible signs of the causative agent. By comparing levels of disease among the population exposed to the toxic substance to a corresponding control group, epidemiological evidence otTers a way to demonstrate to the fact-finder that it is more Shinnick testified that industry had established methods to prevent occupational carpal tunnel syndrome. These include making an analysis of the tools used and performing an ergonomics study. If the study identifies hazards at the work site, prevention and control is employed, which should include redesigning the tools, redesigning the methods used in performing the work, use of protective equipment ... , medical tracking of workers, and training and education of employees. ld. at 804.
97. With the promulgation of ergonomic standards on the federal and state levels, evidence of violations of such standards could be used to support an inference that the claimant's injury was caused by work. The existence of best-practice guidelines for particular industries can serve a similar function. See Gutierrez v. Excel Corp., 106 F.3d 683, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12984, at *3-*4 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting OSHA guidelines for preventing CTDs, including increasing the number of workers performing a task, designing jobs to allow self-pacing when feasible, implementing job rotation, and designing jobs to allow sufficient rest pauses).
likely than not that exposure to the toxic substance caused the harm. 98 Although there has been controversy surrounding the use of epidemiological evidence, its acceptance has grown as judges and commentators have recognized that it is often the only credible means of presenting evidence on causation of occupational diseases.9 9 Like epidemiological evidence in occupational disease cases, ergonomic evidence can be used to convince workers' compensation judges that CTDs are work-related. 100 Ergonomic studies can show that workplaces with job rotation, tasks that are performed differently, or increased numbers of workers can have lower rates of CTDs. And specific, jobbased ergonomic assessments can demonstrate that the particular claimant's work could have been done differently, with a decreased risk of developing a CTD. This kind of evidence-like epidemiological evidencecan give rise to an inference that the work activity caused the injury.
Allowing original bargain because it takes account of common-law developments in how causation can be proven, and provides greater certainty for the compensability of legitimate, work-related CTDs.
C. Shifting the Bargain Towards Emplayers in CTD Cases
In order to uphold the original bargain for CTDs, workers' compensation judges should employ a burden-shifting framework on the issue of "work-relatedness" analogous to that used for Title VII claims. Under this proposal, which could be employed by judges as a matter of common law, the claimant would have the burden of establishing a prima facie case that the injury or illness was work-related. This could be established with medical or ergonomic testimony that there is a substantial possibility that the injury is work-related, along with credible testimony from the claimant. Judges should explicitly take into account the difficulty in proving medical causation thusallowing the claimant to use inferences and circumstantial evidence. Because of the nature of CTDs, undisputed medical opinions on causation are entitled to particular deference, regardless of the presence of "objective medical findings." 101 Establishing a prima facie 'case would create a rebuttable presumption that the injury was work-related. The burden would then shift to the employer to prove that the injury was not related to the claimant's work activities. Besides introducing evidence of non-work causes, the employer could then present evidence of ergonomic improvements already made in the workplace, 102 before the injury occurred, shifting the burden back to the claimant. This burden-shifting approach would bring workers' compensation systems closer to the original vision of efficient compensability of legitimate claims. 1 03 Indeed, there are existing examples of burden-shifting schemes in workers' compensation law-either written into the statute or created by common law. 104 The District of Columbia's workers' compensation statute, for example, contains a presumption of work-relatedness for all claims. 105 103. This proposal is limited to the treatment ofCTDs: The consideration of whether it should be extended to all injuries and occupational diseases is beyond the scope of this Note.
Currently, there are different statutory and common-law rules surrounding the treatment of different types of workers' compensation claims-particularly between injuries and occupational diseases, but also specific burdens of proof and evidentiary standards for heart disease, work-related stress, and emotional trauma. Some jurisdictions have alluded to the need for special rules governing CTDs. See One commentator explained such a presumption as a way of dealing with problems of proof:
The presumption of compensability for specified cumulative injuries or diseases recognizes (1) that a generalized causative link exist~ between the injury or disease and the workplace and (2) that such a causative link will be difficult to need only present some evidence of an injury, and a work-related event which has the potential to result in or contribute to the injury. 106 Once the presumption is triggered, the burden shifts to the employer to produce substantial evidence that the disability was not work-related. 107 Tennessee also has a workers' compensation approach, formulated by judges through common law, that takes account of medical realities. In Tennessee, a doctor's testimony that work activities "could be" the cause of the injury establishes a prima facie case that, combined with the testimony of the claimant, can be enough to support an award of benefits in the absence of contrary evidence from the employer. 108 This proposal has the benefit of taking full advantage of the potential of ergonomics to demonstrate work-relatedness, as epidemiological evidence has done in occupational disease cases. It takes account of the medical uncertainty surrounding cumulative trauma disorders in a way that places the cost of such uncertainty on the employer, not the employee, for reasons familiar from tort theory: The employer is the cheapest cost avoider and insurer, and is best able to spread costs. The proposed burden-shifting framework would also be more faithful to the fundamental nature of the "original bargain," by recognizing a wider range of claims as compensable but limiting individual compensation amounts.
This proposed scheme rests on acknowledging medical realities and limitations, just as the Title VII burden-shifting scheme is built on recognizing the realities of the workplace. 109 As in workers' compensation statprove. The link is therefore presumed, and the worker compensated, so long as the illness or disease is one that is classified by the workers' compensation system as work-related. utes, the burden of proof in a Title VII case always remains with the plaintif£.110 Within this context, however, the Supreme Court in Title VII cases has outlined a framework where the burden of production shifts between plaintiff and defendant during the course of a trial. The Title VII burden-shifting scheme allows plaintiffs to prove a prima facie case through circumstantial evidence because of the difficulty of procuring direct evidence of employment discrimination, and allows factfinders to draw inferences based on commonly held beliefs about how employers make decisions.111 Similarly, the burden-shifting framework proposed in this "incongruous in light of the realities of the modern-day workplace, where exposure to toxic substances that create injury or disease in the future is a major cause of work-related illness and death").
110. See Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 272-80 for an extended discussion of the history and ambiguity behind the term "burden of proof." Indeed, in Title VII jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has used "burden of proof' to refer to "burden of production." See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989) (" [T] o the extent that those cases speak of an employer's 'burden of proof with respect to a legitimate business justification defense ... they should have been understood to mean an employer's production-but not persuasion-burden.").
111 ) (upholding the burden-shifting approach used by the NLRB in "dual motive" cases to determine whether an employee was fired because of antiunion animus on the part of the employer); Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. I982) (explaining the burden-shifting framework for Social Security disability benefits cases). The NLRB approach is analogous both to the Title VII mixed-motive cases, and to the approach proposed here for CTD workers' compensation cases: The employee would have the burden of producing evidence that work activities contributed to the injury, and the employer would have the opportunity to persuade the ALJ that the employee would have developed the injury even in the absence of contributing work activities.
The NLRB approach is also an example of administrative agencies using their specialized knowledge to draw inferences when applying established law to the facts of a case when adjudicating a claim. Similarly, workers' compensation judges also take account of workplace realities on occasion. See, e.g., Venenga v. John Deere Component Works, 498 N.W.2d 422, 425 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (interpreting the "notice" requirement liberally because the court concluded that it "cannot ignore [the fact] that informing an employer of a work-related il~ury creates tension between the employee and the employer"); Guilbeaux v. Martin Mills, Inc., 640 So. 2d 472, 476 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (interpreting the "notice" requirement liberally on the grounds that neither the claimant nor any other worker should be "penalized for trying to work as much as he or she can, despite the pain"); Weise v. Becton-Dickinson Co., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 700, I993 Neb. LEXIS 367, at *22 (I993) (specifYing that in determining the "reasonableness of the time interval" between the onset of symptoms and interruption of employment, the ALJ should consider "any economic, family, or personal circumstances compelling [ Note is based on the premise that there is rarely direct evidence of causation for CTDs because of their gradual, invisible nature.
Some might argue that this proposed burden-shifting approach would simply turn a workers' compensation hearing that would now be a "battle of the dueling doctors" into a battle of the dueling ergonomists. This change, however, would be a welcome development for both policy and institutional reasons. With the current system's focus on medical causation, workers' compensation disputes often turn on technical and uncertain medical questions, providing little incentive for employers to act to prevent injuries. 112 In contrast, disputes over how best to design healthy workplaces create powerful incentives for employers to pay close attention to ergonomics. Employers will be on notice that attention to injury prevention will count in their favor, while a lack of attention to ergonomics can be used to hold them responsible under workers' compensation. Further, from an institutional competence perspective,judges are simply better equipped to evaluate steps that employers could have taken in the workplace than they are to evaluate competing medical opinions on what caused a complex type of injury.
D. Reviving the Exclusive Remedy Doctrine
The lack of compensation for CTDs might not be a problem if workers could bring tort actions for injuries outside the scope of the workers' compensation system. Under the "exclusive remedy" doctrine, employees who get workers' compensation for a particular injury or illness cannot also recover in tort. 11 ~ But by the same token, if a workers' compensation judge decides that a particular claim is not covered under workers' compensation, then the claimant should be able to bring a cause of action under tort law.
114 Traditionally, in cases that were categorically excluded from workers' compensation, the tort remedy remained open. Thus, that workplace caused stress disorder based in part on ALJ's observation that the claimant kept returning to the same job for nineteen years, without acknowledging that she was an immigrant with limited education and skills who one psychologist called "borderline, mildly retarded").
ll2. There is already a financial incentive for employers because workers' compensation insurance is experience-rated, which means that the premium charged depends on the level of benefit payments. But the empirical evidence regarding the success of experience rating as a prevention tool is mixed. workers' compensation, then workers should be able to bring a tort claim-without being barred by the "exclusive remedy" doctrine. 119 lf employers begin facing increasing liability under tort from injuries or illnesses occurring in the workplace, then they will no doubt pressure state legislatures to explicitly cover such claims under the terms of the workers' compensation statutes.
120 This precise chain of events occurred in the past with occupational diseases and is unfolding today, increasingly, with psychological injuries.
121 ln the context of cumulative trauma disorders, however, improper application of the "exclusive remedy" doctrine has, in addition to leaving workers without a remedy, disabled the system's mechanism for evolution and self-correction.
CoNCLUSION
The original bargain of workers' compensation was premised on the assumptions that for work-related injuries, causation was relatively easy to prove, and that removing the fault requirement eliminated the biggest obstacle to compensability for plaintiffs. For the paradigmatic industrial accident, this premise was no doubt true. But for cumulative trauma disorders, causation can be quite difficult to prove, especially since workers' compensation jurisprudence emphasizes medical causation.
Workers' compensation judges should not hesitate to use the new science of ergonomics to infer that an injury is work-related and therefore compensable. Under the burden-shifting framework presented in this Note, judges can make use of such inferences for the benefit of both employees and employers, achieving results that more closely adhere to the original bargain. Although workers' compensation statutes were writ-119. See Exceptions, supra note 116, at 1657 ("Courts interpreting and applying workers' compensation statutes can accomplish part of this adjustment by applying the exclusive remedy rule more selectively and not merely assuming that tort remedies are precluded.").
120. In response to potential tort liability, business lobbyists in some states have prodded legislatures to cover CTDs nominally, keeping the claims outside of the tort system, but making it difficult to recover in workers' compensation with higher burdens of proof. See Burton & Spieler, supra note 40, at 221 (discussing the Virginia legislature's amendment to the workers' compensation statute to provide "nominal, but very narrow" coverage for CTDs). occupational diseases were specifically made compensable, and in jurisdictions where they are still noncompensable," courts have usually held that employees could sue at common law). An Ohio court used similar reasoning in a case involving psychological injuries:
If a psychological injury is not an injury according to the statutory definition of 'injury,' then it is not among the class of injuries from which employers are immune from suit. Any other interpretation is nonsensical .... The lower court decisions remove psychological injuries from the trade-off between employers and employees-employees relinquish their common-law remedies for psychological injuries in return for nothing. That is antithetical to the philosophical underpinnings of the system. Bunger v. Lawson Co., 696 N.E.2d 1029, 1031-32 (Ohio 1998).
